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Abstract— Disturbances and disruptions, both internal and 
external to the system, are a major concern for system architects 
who are responsible for ensuring that their systems maintain 
value robustness no matter what occurs.  These perturbations 
can have multiple causes and can affect a system in multiple 
ways.  This paper presents a taxonomy of disturbances and 
disruptions to assist system architects and researchers in 
identifying the ways in which systems can fail to deliver value.  
By doing so, this taxonomy falls into a larger research effort to 
develop survivability design principles that will help system 
architects design systems that prevent, mitigate and recover from 
disturbances.    
Keywords-surviability; robustness; safety; reliability; systems; 
systems of systems; disturbances; disruptions; perturbations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Systems always operate within a particular context, which 
includes specific environmental conditions, resources and 
stakeholder expectations.  For many complex systems that have 
long lifecycles, the context is expected to be dynamic and 
sometimes unfavorable to the system’s mode of operation.  
Even if the new context is advantageous, the change itself may 
be problematic, particularly if the change is sudden, unexpected 
and/or significant.  Even if the context is static, systems 
themselves may change (or be changed) as well, either 
intentionally, or unintentionally.  Regardless of whether the 
context changes or the system changes, whether the 
perturbations were intentional or unintentional, stakeholders 
desire a value-robust system that will continue to effectively 
perform no matter what.   
In the authors’ research efforts, a major goal is to develop a 
set of design principles that will guide system architects in 
identifying and selecting design choices that will sustain a 
threshold level of value delivery no matter what.  To do that, 
the what needs to be clearly understood, both by the system 
architects, who have to select design choices based on what 
might happen, and by researchers who seek to identify these 
design principles.  However, understanding what the problem 
is can be quite difficult.  To illustrate this, consider the 
following example: An exhausted pilot is flying through a 
thunderstorm.  The rain has reduced his visibility, and he is too 
tired to notice that the plane’s altitude is low.  Suddenly, the 
plane clips the side of a tower, loses a wing, spirals out of 
control, crashes into the ground, and explodes in a fiery 
inferno.  How can system architects make a plane survivable in 
such a scenario?  They could design a plane that can safely land 
with only one wing, but will this make the plane survivable?  If 
the architects are not including low visibility and pilot 
exhaustion as part of the context, then their Concept of 
Operations (CONOPs) for safely landing on just one wing, i.e. 
how the pilot and components of the plane interact with each 
other and the environment so that the plane lands safely, may 
not actually make the plane survivable.  Additionally, the 
collision with the tower could have done more damage than 
just clipping the wing, and thus this particular survivability 
solution may only be effective in extremely rare situations.  
Perhaps looking at the cause of the crash would be more 
productive.  The system architects could include windshield 
wipers to mitigate the rain’s effect on visibility, but a similar 
visibility problem could arise simply from the plane flying at 
nighttime, as well.  Either visibility problem could lead to a 
loss of situational awareness by the pilot, which leads to the 
collision with the tower.  Preventing and mitigating the 
collision with the tower may be the best way to achieve 
survivability, both for this scenario and others (such as flying 
off course and random component failure). 
This paper describes a research-derived taxonomy by which 
perturbations can be characterized to help both researchers and 
system architects identify the ways in which value delivery can 
be degraded, so that they can design systems to avoid, mitigate 
and recover from a large variety of endogenous and exogenous 
changes which may arise during the system’s lifetime. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
A. Perturbations, Disruptions and Disturbances 
Suppose an aircraft in flight experiences complete and 
sudden engine failure.  Although there may be numerous 
causes for the engine failure and the circumstances that led to 
the failure may have taken a certain finite time to develop, the 
actual moment of failure can be considered an impulse event 
of zero (or near-zero) duration.  In the period immediately 
following the failure, the aircraft is forced to make an 
emergency landing instead of flying to its original destination.  
We can define a disruption as an unintended, instantaneous, 
discontinuous state change of a system’s form, operations, or 
context, which could jeopardize value delivery.  The sudden 
failure of the engine is an example of a disruption.  Since 
systems are expected to provide satisfactory value under ideal 
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through other lines in the network.  This increase load in the 
lines caused some of them to fail as well.  As more lines failed, 
more load was placed on the remaining lines until they failed as 
well, leading to what is referred to as a cascading failure.  
Eventually, entire power plant generators were shut down, 
which lead to a massive blackout in the Northeastern United 
States and some parts of Canada.  In some parts, traffic lights 
failed as well, which lead to some fatalities including a teenage 
cyclist struck by a car in Ontario.  Indirectly, the death in 
Ontario was due to an untrimmed tree in Ohio, although it was 
not the sole cause.  There were multiple incidents and 
circumstances along the way that also caused this unfortunate 
outcome.  For instance, there was a software bug in one of the 
Ohio power plants that prevented authorities from recognizing 
and mitigating the power outage earlier [5].  Also, the teenager 
did not have lights on his bicycle, nor was he wearing a helmet, 
both of which are speculated to have contributed to the fatality 
[6].  
 Figure 3.  Chain reaction during the Northeast Blackout of 2003. 
Typically, strategies for Type I survivability involve 
mitigating and reducing threats and hazards before they 
become perturbations (i.e., addressing the “cause”), whereas 
Type II and III survivability design principles address 
mitigating and recovering from the effects.  Since certain 
effects have multiple causes and certain causes have multiple 
effects, separating perturbations into cause and effect is critical 
because it allows system architects to focus on addressing the 
causes and effects that will have the most impact on the 
system’s survivability.  System architects do not have the 
resources to address all possible perturbations.  Similarly, 
research has suggested that some mechanisms for survivability, 
such as dependability and security, are incompatible [7].  Thus, 
by realizing that certain perturbations have multiple causes 
and/or effects can help system architects identify the strategies 
that will have the greatest impact on overall survivability and 
trade off design options accordingly. 
Another reason it is important to separate perturbations by 
cause and effect is because it helps system architects focus on 
what they can affect and what they can’t.  Without thinking 
about cause and effect, architects of the UAV aerial imaging 
system may not understand how they can design a system that 
can survive “bad weather.”  Specifically, how does a system 
avoid “bad weather” (Type I survivability), particularly if the 
system is stationary?  How does it mitigate “bad weather” and 
recover from it?   Rather, system architects must realize “bad 
weather” is a disturbance that causes many other disruptions 
and disturbances, and these perturbations are the ones over 
which the system has more control. For example, one effect 
that bad weather has on the system is the blurry image caused 
by precipitation on the lens of the camera.  In this case the 
effect (blurry image) and the cause (precipitation on the lens of 
the camera) are very clear, and appropriate design principles 
can be applied.  Type I survivability might focus on preventing 
exposure to rain by sheltering the lens and preventing the 
precipitation from coming into contact with the lens, while 
Type II survivability might focus on image processing 
techniques that specifically correct for precipitation-induced 
blurry images.  Thus, by clearly specifying the disturbance as a 
specific cause and effect, as opposed to an ambiguous 
statement like “bad weather,” system architects can more easily 
develop and incorporate survivability strategies. 
III. DETERMING A SUITABLE TAXONOMY 
There are many ways to classify a perturbation.  Initial 
attempts at classification yielded categories such as “origin” 
(whether the perturbation started externally or internally) and 
“intent” (whether the perturbation was caused intentionally by 
an intelligent entity, or not) [8].  These types of classifications 
are very useful if the system architects want to target specific 
types of perturbations and ignore others.  For instance, a 
system architect of a yogurt manufacturing plant may not feel 
it is necessary to protect against hacker attacks because the 
plant does not have any hostile adversaries.  Of course, not 
every type of perturbation can be prevented, mitigated or 
recovered from and priorities have to be considered.  
However, to dismiss entire classes of perturbations without 
analysis is risky as well, since many of the largest system 
failures came about from events that the system architects 
never considered (e.g., 9/11 attacks and 2003 Northeast 
Blackout).  Sometimes the solution to one problem is also the 
solution to another.  For example, an authentication procedure 
can not only protect against unintentional purchases by 
legitimate users (errors), but also protect against unauthorized 
attacks or security compromises.  If a taxonomy is developed 
by which perturbations are categorized independent of their 
effect on the system, such as “artificial” vs. “unintentional,” 
then in the presence of time and resource constraints, there is a 
risk that system architects will implement solutions based on 
perturbations that are expected (i.e., “known unknowns”).  
However, what about perturbations whose very nature we do 
not know because they did not exist when we designed the 
system, or were never a problem before?  It would be better to 
focus on the effects on a system and categorize disturbances 
that way, so that designers can better handle disturbances that 
have similar effects, even if they do not understand or cannot 
predict what those disturbances may be, specifically (i.e., 
“unknown unknowns”).   
IV. ANALYZING SYSTEMS FOR POSSIBLE PERTURBATIONS 
There are several ways to analyze systems for possible 
perturbations.  Two of the more popular are Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and the Failure Mode Effects (and Criticality) 
Analysis (FMEA/FMECA).  
A. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis is a top-down approach [9] that uses 
Boolean logic to determine the causes of a particular single 
failure.  Since FTA is a deductive approach, which starts with 
a failure state and works backwards towards single events that 
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may have been responsible, it does not always find all possible 
initiating faults. 
B. FMEA/FMECA 
FMEA/FMECA looks at initiating faults, and tries to 
determine their immediate and subsequent effects (i.e., 
“failures”) on the overall system.  FMEA/FMECA describes 
“failure” as the “loss of an intended function of a device under 
stated conditions” [10], which addresses component / 
capability failures, but does not address operational 
perturbations.  Additionally, FMEA/FMECA often does not 
consider human/software failures, nor does it address 
combined failures [11].   
C. Cause and Effect Mapping 
Recognizing the complex relationship between disruptions, 
disturbances, causes and effects, a mapping such as Fig 4 can 
highlight a perturbation’s relationship with other 
perturbations, allowing system architects to recognize 
potential cascading failures and common problems, and 
prioritize survivability efforts accordingly.  Only perturbations 
and threats that can influence the system (or for which the 
system has some form of control) are considered. Since the 
mapping is generalized, it allows system architects to generate 
possible perturbations of interest by thinking about what might 
cause a perturbation, and what other effects may it have.  New 
causes and effects that fit or don’t fit into the existing mapping 
are added and new relationships can be drawn to various 
existing causes and effects.  Once the generalized cause and 
effect mapping is done, specific perturbations and hazards 
from the categories are chosen for consideration, relevant to 
the particular system and context under consideration. To deal 
with these known perturbations and hazards, a detailed hazard 
analysis such as FMEA/FMECA or FTA along with existing 
survivability design principles, can help system architects 
develop specific survivability strategies.  An important 
property of Fig 4 is the non-linearity of the mapping.  For 
example, an operator error is a perturbation that can easily be 
the initial starting point for a complex failure.  For no other 
reason other than daydreaming, an operator can make a 
mistake and push the wrong button, which can start a chain 
reaction of events that cause multiple problems.  However, an 
operator error can also be the result of other perturbations.  If 
there is bad weather, a pilot may make a mistake due to the 
poor visibility.  If communications are down, an operator may 
make a mistake by assuming that there are no other vehicles in 
the area.  If a constituent system leaves a system of systems 
and the workload increases for the remaining systems, then an 
operator may make a mistake simply because they are 
overworked.  Even worse, perturbations may be repeated and 
even grow in intensity.  If an operator error causes an increase 
in workload (for instance by repeating a task that was already 
done), then that increase in workload may cause additional 
operator errors, which may in turn increases the workload, and 
so forth. 
V. CLASSIFYING PERTURBATIONS 
A first attempt at classifying perturbations for systems, such 
as those that perform maritime security using UAVs, is 
presented in Table 1.  After brainstorming, the table begins 
with some examples of perturbations of interest, such as an 
aircraft colliding with another aircraft, or an increase in fuel 
prices (some “known unknowns”).  Only the immediate effects 
are noted, such as physical damage to components, or cost 
increase.  These effects, which are general in nature, are then 
added to the cause and effect mapping (Fig 4).  Then, looking 
at a particular effect on the cause and effect mapping, other 
possible causes and effects for it is added, in a general way, to 
the map.  These may generate further specific disruptions and 
disturbances, which are then added to the perturbation table, 
and so on.  Finally, once brainstorming has not generated any 
additional perturbations, a final column discussing possible 
survivability solutions to the specific perturbations is added to 
the table.  Not surprisingly, since some of the perturbations 
share similar cause and effect characteristics, these can be 
addressed by similar survivability design principles. 
 
Figure 4: Cause and effect mapping. 
Although the perturbations examples presented in Table 1 
may seem dissimilar at first, a few commonalties emerge.  
Generally speaking, all perturbations of interest may eventually 
lead to value loss.  Value loss occurs when one or more of the 
following main effects result from a perturbation: capability 
loss, capability degradation, change in mode of operations, cost 
increase, or change in stakeholder expectations.
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         TABLE 1. EXAMPLE PERTURBATION TABLE FOR A MARITIME SECURITY SYSTEM 
Perturbation 
Example Type Immediate Effect Main Effects Causes of Perturbation Survivability Solutions 
Aircraft struck by 
lightning Disruption 
Physical damage to 
components 
Capability loss, capability 
degradation Context change (weather) 
Decrease cross-
sectional area, divert 
lightning away (e.g., 
lightning rod) 
Crash between 
system and other 
mobile entity, crash 
between system and 
environment 
Disruption Physical damage to components 
Capability loss, capability 
degradation 
Collision (caused by 
operator error, context 
change, diminished 
situational awareness) 
Decrease cross-
sectional area, increase 
maneuverability, 
increase situational 
awareness 
High winds creating 
turbulence Disturbance Mode of operation change 
Change in mode of 
operation Context change (weather) 
Move away from 
disturbance, better 
aerodynamic design, 
heavier mass 
Precipitation builds 
on lenses Disturbance Capability loss Capability loss Context change (weather) 
Wipers, better image 
processing algorithms 
Fuel price increase Disruption Cost increase Cost Increase Resource scarcity, mode of operation change 
Store excess resource 
when not scarce, 
change to alternate 
resource 
Environmental ozone 
regulation makes 
component obsolete 
Disruption Capability loss Capability loss Context change (environmental) 
Use alternate 
capabilities to achieve 
desired outcome.  
Operator gives wrong 
command to machine Disruption Capability degradation 
Change in mode of 
operation 
Context change (weather, 
bad working conditions), 
workload exceeds 
component capacity  
Increase capacity 
(increase operators, 
increase automation), 
increase training, 
double check operator 
instructions 
Communication 
interference Disturbance Miscommunication 
Change in mode of 
operation 
Context change (weather), 
electronic attack 
Eliminate unnecessary 
communications (co-
locate components) , 
switch to alternate 
communication 
channel, increase signal 
power 
Noise from one UAV 
interferes with audio 
recording of another 
Disturbance Component interference Capability degradation 
Close proximity of 
components, tight 
coupling 
Reduce proximity of 
components, reduce 
noise 
Missile strikes 
aircraft Disruption 
Physical damage to 
components 
Capability loss, capability 
degradation 
Hostile adversaries, large 
cross-sectional area,  
enemy has capability 
Use aircraft instead of 
land or sea vehicles, 
decrease cross-sectional 
area, increase 
deterrence and decrease 
intent of hostile 
adversaries (e.g., 
political pressure), 
preemptively strike 
Friendly artillery unit  
withdraws from SoS Disruption Capability loss Capability loss 
Component has 
operational / managerial 
independence 
Have redundant 
components, alternative 
CONOPs 
Hacker attack Disturbance Authority problem 
Capability loss, capability 
degradation, change in 
mode of operation 
Hostile adversaries 
Secure authentication, 
network analysis tools, 
increase deterrence and 
decrease intent of 
hostile adversaries (e.g., 
political pressure), 
preemptively strike 
Random component 
failure Disruption 
Random component 
failure 
Capability loss, capability 
degradation Context change (weather) 
Decrease exposure to 
hostile environments, 
limit use 
Miscommunication 
between components 
Disruption 
and/or 
Disturbance, 
depending 
on how long 
it lasts 
Change in mode of 
operation 
Change in mode of 
operation 
Communication 
interference, Capability 
loss / degradation  
Redundant 
communication 
channels, error 
checking, elimination 
of unnecessary 
communications (e.g., 
co-locate components) 
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A. Capability Loss 
The form of the system is the current set of operational 
elements and capabilities that a system has.  If the form 
changes, particularly if a component is functionally removed 
(i.e., no longer functioning in the system), then value delivery 
is likely impacted.  There are many reasons a component can 
be lost, such as if it is voluntarily or involuntarily removed, 
critically damaged by an external force, fails randomly, does 
not have the resources to function, or is unwilling to participate 
(a problem associated with autonomous component systems in 
a larger SoS).      
B. Capability Degradation 
Capability degradation is when a component is still 
performing according to the CONOPs, but not as well as it 
should be.  For instance, a CPU under load may not be able to 
respond to the tasks it needs to in a timely manner.  
Degradation can be the result of a number of circumstances 
including physical damage, insufficient resources and 
excessive demand. 
C. Change in Mode of Operation 
Perturbations can cause the system to operate differently, 
either to a viable mode of operation specified in its system 
architecture [12], or to other some mode of operation.  For 
example, turbulence may force an aircraft to fly a different 
route and altitude than it normally would fly, increasing the 
flight time and burning more fuel.  Naturally, value delivery of 
the aircraft to the stakeholders is decreased as a result.  In 
systems with autonomous, or semi-autonomous constituent 
systems (such as most systems of systems), coordination of the 
capabilities must be maintained at all times.  For many reasons, 
such as miscommunication, authorization problems, and 
diminished situational awareness, coordination errors occur.  
These errors include more than one entity attempting to 
perform the same task, no entity performing a required task, 
tasks being performed out of order, and so forth. 
D. Cost Increase 
All engineered systems have an associated cost, which 
typically is to be minimized.  If a disturbance increases the cost 
of the system, without increasing the performance as well, then 
it will likely decrease the value it provides to stakeholders. 
E. Change in Stakeholder Expectations 
The value of a system depends upon stakeholder 
expectations.  If these expectations change, then the value of 
the system can change, even if cost and performance remain 
static. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The eventual goal of this research is to develop a set of 
design principles that will guide system architects in 
recognizing and evaluating system design options, both in form 
and mode of operation, which will increase the system’s ability 
to deliver value no matter what.  This paper works toward that 
goal by clarifying that disruptions and disturbances have 
different event durations, so that system architects can 
recognize their impact on potential survivability design 
choices.  This paper also shows that by using causal chains and 
working backwards from value impact, a system architect can 
begin to determine appropriate locations for intervention, based 
on what is within their control and resource constraints.  
Finally, this paper shows that by using a cause and effect 
mapping, there are general categories of effects that can be 
useful as a taxonomic basis, especially for dealing with known 
unknowns and potential unknown unknowns.  
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